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Deaths during the 1918–19 inﬂ   uenza pandemic have 
been attributed to a hypervirulent inﬂ   uenza strain. Hence, 
preparations for the next pandemic focus almost exclusively 
on vaccine prevention and antiviral treatment for infections 
with a novel inﬂ  uenza strain. However, we hypothesize that 
infections with the pandemic strain generally caused self-lim-
ited (rarely fatal) illnesses that enabled colonizing strains of 
bacteria to produce highly lethal pneumonias. This sequential-
infection hypothesis is consistent with characteristics of the 
1918–19 pandemic, contemporaneous expert opinion, and 
current knowledge regarding the pathophysiologic effects of 
inﬂ  uenza viruses and their interactions with respiratory bac-
teria. This hypothesis suggests opportunities for prevention 
and treatment during the next pandemic (e.g., with bacterial 
vaccines and antimicrobial drugs), particularly if a pandemic 
strain–speciﬁ  c vaccine is unavailable or inaccessible to iso-
lated, crowded, or medically underserved populations.
M
any inﬂ  uenza experts, policy makers, and knowl-
edgeable observers believe that a novel inﬂ  uenza 
A (H1N1) strain directly caused most deaths during the 
1918–19 pandemic, often from a hemorrhagic pneumoni-
tis that rapidly progressed to acute respiratory distress 
syndrome and death (1–3). Not surprisingly, plans and re-
sources to respond to the next inﬂ  uenza pandemic focus 
almost exclusively on the virus, i.e., preventive vaccines 
and antiviral treatment of infections with a novel inﬂ  uenza 
strain (4). However, healthcare providers, medical experts, 
and published data from the 1918 period suggest that most 
deaths were caused by secondary bacterial pneumonias 
(5–12); hemorrhagic pneumonitis that rapidly progressed 
to death was considered an alarming but uncommon clini-
cal manifestation (8,11–13).
Undoubtedly, the 1918–19 pandemic strain of inﬂ  u-
enza had unique pathophysiologic effects. In the wake of 
its worldwide spread, the number of deaths was unprec-
edented. However, contemporaneous reports suggest that 
the pathophysiologic effects of the virus, in and of them-
selves, did not directly cause most (or even many) of the 
deaths during the pandemic. If the pandemic strain was 
not inherently hypervirulent (i.e., if direct pathophysio-
logic effects of the virus were necessary but not sufﬁ  cient 
to cause death in a large proportion of immunologically 
susceptible hosts) and if bacterial infections were also 
necessary causes of most deaths during the pandemic, 
then preparations for the next pandemic should focus on 
more than preventing and treating infections with a novel 
inﬂ  uenza strain alone.
We have identiﬁ  ed epidemiologic and clinical char-
acteristics of the 1918–19 pandemic that are not readily 
consistent with the view that most deaths were caused by 
the direct effects of an inherently hypervirulent virus and 
were clinically expressed as rapidly progressing, ultimately 
fatal pneumonitis. Our alternative hypothesis is consistent 
with known characteristics and ﬁ  rsthand accounts of the 
pandemic and contains implications for preparing for the 
next pandemic.
Epidemiologic and Clinical Characteristics 
of 1918–19 Pandemic
Disease Usually Mild and Self-limited
The 1918–19 pandemic spread worldwide with re-
markable speed. Over several months, a novel strain of 
inﬂ  uenza virus attacked communities worldwide; most 
persons were immunologically susceptible. However, 
most cases followed a mild or self-limited course. Had 
the pandemic strain been inherently hypervirulent, in the 
absence of modern lifesaving measures one would expect 
exceptionally high case-fatality rates for all affected pop-
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ulations. Yet during that pandemic, most infected persons 
had self-limited clinical courses and complete recovery 
(3,7,8,11,14). For most affected populations, the case-
fatality incidence was <2% and the overall mortality rate 
was <0.5% (3,7,8,13,15,16).
Clinical Courses of Fatal Cases Highly 
Variable and Often Prolonged
In most affected populations, <5% of deaths oc-
curred within 3 days of illness onset, median time from 
illness onset to death was 7–10 days, and signiﬁ  cant num-
bers of deaths occurred >2 weeks after initial symptoms 
(5,17–22; Figures 1, 2). These ﬁ  ndings do not suggest that 
an inherently virulent virus caused fulminant disease and 
rapid progression to death in high proportions of infected 
persons—or even in most fatal cases. In the prominently 
cited experience of Sydney, Australia, most inﬂ  uenza-re-
lated deaths occurred within 3 days of hospital admission 
(2,23,24); however, only the sickest patients were admitted 
to Sydney hospitals (23). In New South Wales overall, only 
≈10% of fatalities occurred within 3 days of illness onset 
(Figure 1, panel F; Figure 2) (20).
Progression to Death, No Difference between 
Early and Late Pneumonias
If most deaths resulted from primary inﬂ  uenza pneu-
monias that progressed rapidly, one might expect that fatal 
pneumonias that developed early in clinical courses would 
progress more rapidly than those that developed later. 
However, the ﬁ  ndings of Opie et al. suggest that primary 
inﬂ  uenza pneumonias did not progress unusually rapidly to 
death. Opie et al. conducted postmortem examinations and 
documented the clinical courses of 234 fatal cases that oc-
curred during the epidemic at Camp Pike, Arkansas, USA 
(5). They found that the durations of pneumonia before 
death were similar among those in whom pneumonia de-
veloped early (0–2 days) versus later (3–5, 6–8, >8 days) 
after inﬂ  uenza onset (Figure 3) (5).
Mortality and Case-Fatality Rates High for 
Young Adults and Other Unlikely Groups
During the pandemic, overall mortality and case-fatality 
rates were higher for young adults, indigenous and other 
relatively closed populations, and certain military and oc-
cupational subgroups than for their respective counterparts. 
Case-fatality and mortality rates were higher for those 25–40 
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Figure 1. Percentage distributions of fatal cases of inﬂ  uenza–pneumonia  during 
1918–19 inﬂ  uenza pandemics, by estimated days of illness before death. A) Inﬂ  uenza–
bronchopneumonia, Cook County Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, USA (n = 599) (estimated 
from chart 2 in [19]). B) Australian Imperial Forces, 1918 (n = 972) (G.D. Shanks, 
unpub. data). C) General population, Prussia (n = 6,223) (22). D) US Army autopsy 
series (n = 94) (estimated from supplementary Figure 2 in [17]). E) Inﬂ  uenza  with 
secondary staphylococcal pneumonias, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, USA (n = 153) 
(interpolation of data in Table 1 in [21]). F) New South Wales, Australia (n = 3,866) (20). 
G) US Army training camp, Camp Pike, Arkansas, USA (n = 234) (5). Horizontal bars 
indicate interquartile ranges; vertical lines indicate medians.Deaths from Bacterial Pneumonia, 1918–19 Pandemic
years of age (particularly men) than for those younger or 
older (15,16). Explanations have included aberrant host im-
mune responses to infections with the subtype H1N1 pan-
demic strain—increasing the risk for “cytokine storm” (1)—
and higher cardiac stroke volumes in young adults (24).
However, at US military training camps, recent arrivals 
had worse clinical outcomes than their similarly aged, male 
counterparts who had been in camps longer. For example, 
during wartime, 60% of all inﬂ  uenza–pneumonia deaths af-
fected soldiers who had been in the service <4 months (to-
tal inﬂ  uenza–pneumonia deaths, 34,446; deaths of soldiers 
with <4 months of service, 20,837) (10). In the Australian 
Imperial Forces, mortality rates differed by 50-fold across 
units of similarly aged soldiers in France and the United 
Kingdom (G.D. Shanks, unpub. data). US soldiers and Ma-
rines who were being transported on ships had similar inﬂ  u-
enza case rates but higher case-fatality rates (inﬂ  uenza cases 
11,385, case rate 8.80/1,000, deaths 733) than the sailors 
who were permanently assigned to the same ships (inﬂ  u-
enza cases 2,123, case rate 8.88/1,000, deaths 42) (Figure 
4, panel A) (9). Among Australians and Americans, sharply 
higher death rates were reported for civilian miners (6,25) 
and military tunnelers (G.D. Shanks, unpub. data) than for 
their similarly aged counterparts (Figure 4, panel B).
In South Africa, case-fatality rates were >2× higher 
for “Blacks, Indians, and Coloureds” (inﬂ  uenza  cases 
2,162,152, deaths 127,745, case-fatality rate 5.9%) than for 
“Whites” (inﬂ  uenza cases 454,653, deaths 11,726, case-
fatality rate 2.6%) (26); and the inﬂ  uenza-associated mor-
tality rate was >30× higher for Kimberley diamond miners 
(inﬂ  uenza deaths 2,564, overall mortality rate 22.4%) (26) 
than for Rand gold miners (inﬂ  uenza cases 61,000, deaths 
1,147, case-fatality rate 1.9%, overall mortality rate 0.6%) 
(26). In Rhodesia, inﬂ  uenza-related mortality rate was ≈4× 
higher in mining compounds (9.2%) than in villages (2.3%) 
(among mine workers, overall inﬂ   uenza cases 19,471, 
deaths 2,851, case-fatality rate 14.6%) (27).
During the pandemic in New Zealand, death rates 
were ≈7× higher for indigenous (Maori) populations (inﬂ  u-
enza deaths 2,160, mortality rate 42.3/1,000) than for other 
residents (inﬂ  uenza-related mortality rate 4.5/1,000) (28). 
Across other South Paciﬁ  c islands, death rates were gener-
ally higher for indigenous populations than for others. For 
example, death rates in Fiji were ≈4× higher for indigenous 
Fijians (inﬂ  uenza cases 5,154, mortality rate 5.7%) than for 
Europeans (inﬂ  uenza cases 69, mortality rate 1.4%) (8). In 
Guam, where military and indigenous populations were 
both located, ≈4.5% of the indigenous population, but only 
1 sailor assigned to the US Naval base, died (9). In Saipan, 
“practically all of the inhabitants contracted the disease”; 
however, the mortality rate was reportedly sharply higher 
for Chamorrans (12.0%) than for Caroline Islanders (0.4%) 
(29). In Western Samoa, an estimated 22% (deaths 7,542) 
of the entire population died (8,30).
In various communities of Canada, Sweden, Norway, 
and the United States, mortality rates were estimated to 
be 3–70× higher for indigenous than for nonindigenous 
populations (8,31). Across British colonial countries of the 
Caribbean, the difference in mortality rates was >45-fold 
between the least affected (Bahamas: deaths ≈60, mortality 
rate ≈0.1%; Barbados: deaths ≈190, mortality rate ≈0.1%) 
and the most affected (Belize: deaths ≈2,000, mortality rate 
≈4.6%); in general, the highest mortality rates in the Carib-
bean affected East Indian workers, Native Americans, and 
the poor (32). 
The ﬁ  ndings of sharply different clinical courses and 
outcomes in subgroups of infected persons of similar ages, 
sociocultural circumstances, and prior health states belie 
the importance of host immune intensity and cardiac stroke 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 14, No. 8, August 2008  1195 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
55.0
60.0
65.0
70.0
75.0
80.0
85.0
90.0
95.0
0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
Estimated days after illness onset  
 
 
 
%
 
D
e
a
t
h
s
,
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
New South Wales, Australia
Prussia
Cook County Hospital, Chicago, Illinois
Australian Imperial Forces
US Army, Camp Jackson, South Carolina
US Army, autopsy series
US Army, Camp Pike, Arkansas
Figure 2. Cumulative percentage deaths from inﬂ  uenza–pneumonia, 
by days (estimated) from illness onset, among fatal cases during 
various epidemics, 1918–19 (5,17–22). Vertical arrows indicate 
median no. days to death. 
Figure 3. Cumulative percentage deaths by days of pneumonia, in 
relation to days of illness before pneumonia, among 234 US Army 
soldiers who died of inﬂ  uenza–pneumonia at Camp Pike, Arkansas, 
USA, autumn 1918 (5).
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volume as the deﬁ  nitive determinants of clinical outcomes 
after infection. Undoubtedly, factors other than the inher-
ent virulence of the virus or the robustness of the host’s 
immune response affected the clinical expressions of in-
ﬂ  uenza infections. In his classic review, E.O. Jordan con-
cluded that “one of the chief reasons for the great variation 
in case-fatality in different groups is undoubtedly the na-
ture and relative abundance of secondary invaders ... The 
excessively high mortality in certain army camps, on cer-
tain transports and in particular hospitals or barracks seems 
most readily explicable in this way” (6).
Common Respiratory Bacteria Most Often 
Recovered from Pneumonia Patients
During the 1918–19 pandemic, the bacteria most often 
recovered from the sputum, lungs, and blood of pneumo-
nia patients, alive or dead, were common colonizers of the 
upper respiratory tracts of healthy persons, i.e., Hemophi-
lus inﬂ  uenzae,  Streptococcus pneumoniae,  S. pyogenes, 
and/or Staphylococcus aureus (5–13). During local epidem-
ics, 1 or 2 of these species accounted for most isolates from 
pneumonia patients (5–13). For example, among pneumo-
nia patients at 21 US Army camps in the autumn of 1918, 
S. pneumoniae (especially types III and IV) predominated 
at 12 camps, H. inﬂ  uenzae at 6, and Streptococcus spp. at 
3 (5). S. aureus was a major cause of pneumonia among 
persons with fatal cases at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, 
USA, and Camp Syracuse, New York, USA (5,12,21).
The bacteria most often recovered from the lungs of 
patients who died were all common colonizers of the up-
per respiratory tracts of healthy persons. Types III and 
IV pneumococci (ubiquitous colonizing strains) were of-
ten recovered from the lungs of patients who died during 
the 1918–19 pandemic but were not considered important 
pathogens otherwise. Opie et al. concluded, “Every patient 
with inﬂ  uenza must be considered a potential source of 
pneumococcus or hemolytic streptococcus infection for his 
neighbor ... Every person engaged in the care of patients 
with respiratory diseases must also be regarded as a poten-
tial source of danger” (5).
Mortality Rates More Strongly Correlated with 
Pneumonia Rates than with Clinical Case Rates
If the pandemic strain had been inherently hyperviru-
lent and had directly caused most inﬂ  uenza-related deaths, 
one would expect strong correlations between clinical case 
rates and mortality rates across affected populations. Yet in 
affected communities in general, correlations were stronger 
between mortality and pneumonia rates than between mor-
tality and clinical case rates (15,16).
In general, age-related mortality rates and pneumonia 
rates—but not clinical case rates—were W-shaped with 
sharp peaks for young adults. Inﬂ  uenza-related mortality 
rates peaked sharply for young adults 25–40 years of age. 
Data from household surveys throughout the United States 
suggest that pneumonia case rates also peaked for young 
adults (Figure 5) (15,16). In contrast, inﬂ  uenza case rates 
were highest for school-aged children, plateaued at a lower 
level for young adults, and continuously declined through 
older age groups (Figure 5) (15,16).
After reviewing US household survey data, a senior 
statistician of the US Public Health Service concluded that 
“... these relations indicate that the mortality is determined 
primarily by the incidence of pneumonia. The cause of 
the high mortality in young adult life evidently lies in the 
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Figure 4. A) Inﬂ  uenza–pneumonia-related morbidity and mortality 
cumulative incidence rates, in relation to status on troop ships, 
Cruiser and Transport Service, US Navy, 1918 (9). B) Inﬂ  uenza–
pneumonia mortality rates for white men, by employment as 
coal miner versus other industrial occupation, and by age group, 
October–December 1918 (6).Deaths from Bacterial Pneumonia, 1918–19 Pandemic
complicating pneumonia. All of the relations ... bear this 
out ...” (16)
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Associated 
with Lower Overall Mortality Rates
Systematic analyses of mortality data from large US cit-
ies have shown that nonpharmaceutical interventions (e.g., 
isolation, quarantine, closing schools, banning public gather-
ings) were associated with lower inﬂ  uenza-related mortality 
rates during the autumn of 1918 (33). Given the rapidity of 
spread of the pandemic, reductions of mortality rate asso-
ciated with nonpharmaceutical interventions are unlikely to 
have been primarily related to reductions of inﬂ  uenza trans-
mission (particularly in large US cities during wartime).
On the basis of their extensive studies in US Army 
camps during the 1918–19 pandemic, Opie et al. concluded 
that “Secondary contact infection may be responsible for the 
development of pneumonia in patients with inﬂ  uenza. ... It is 
probable that secondary contact infection can be effectively 
prevented only by individual isolation and strict quarantine 
of every patient.” (5) Perhaps the reduction in mortality rate 
after isolation, quarantine, and other social distancing mea-
sures were implemented resulted from decreased exposures 
of persons with inﬂ  uenza to bacterial respiratory pathogens 
to which they were transiently highly susceptible.
Firsthand Accounts and Reviews: Most Deaths 
Caused by Secondary Bacterial Pneumonias 
During the pandemic, medical journals contained hun-
dreds of detailed reports of local inﬂ  uenza epidemics. In ad-
dition, during and after the pandemic, remarkably detailed 
reviews of relevant epidemiologic and clinical records and 
population-based surveys were conducted by government 
and academic institutions worldwide. Care providers and 
experts of the day in epidemiology, pathology, bacteriology, 
and infectious diseases clearly concurred that pneumonias 
from secondary bacterial infections caused most deaths dur-
ing the pandemic (5–14). In his classic review, Jordan sum-
marized the key factors involved in the production of inﬂ  u-
enza-related pneumonia during the pandemic as follows:
“(1) The inﬂ  uenza virus weakens the resistant power of 
the pulmonary tissues so that various bacteria are able to 
play the role of secondary invaders; (2) the precise na-
ture of the secondary—and tertiary—invaders is largely 
a matter of accident, dependent on the occurrence of 
particular bacteria in the respiratory tract of persons at 
the time of infection, and in the case of group outbreaks, 
on their occurrence in contacts; (3) the character of the 
resulting pneumonia, clinical and pathologic, is largely 
determined by the nature of the secondary invaders, 
whether Pfeiffer bacillus, streptococcus, pneumococ-
cus, or other organisms; (4) there seems little doubt that 
the inﬂ  uenza virus, besides depressing the general pul-
monary resistance, also acts directly on the pulmonary 
tissues, causing capillary necrosis, edema, and hemor-
rhage; (5) it seems to be true, therefore, that the fatal 
outcome of inﬂ  uenza pneumonia is determined partly 
by the degree to which the inﬂ  uenza virus depresses lo-
cal and general pulmonary resistance, and partly by the 
virulence and nature of the bacteria which invade the 
tissues in the wake of the speciﬁ  c virus” (6).
Hypothesis
We endorse a sequential-infection hypothesis. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the known epidemiologic and 
clinical characteristics of the 1918–19 inﬂ  uenza pandemic, 
reﬂ  ects the consensus views of ﬁ  rsthand observers and con-
temporaneous experts, and incorporates current knowledge 
regarding the effects of inﬂ  uenza on physical and immune 
respiratory tract defenses and physiologic interactions be-
tween inﬂ  uenza and respiratory bacteria (12,13,34–36).
A novel strain of inﬂ  uenza spread rapidly through-
out the world in 1918. For most patients, infection with 
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Figure 5. A) Estimated age group–speciﬁ  c  inﬂ   uenza case rates 
(15,16). B) Estimated age group–speciﬁ   c pneumonia rates and 
mortality rates, based on household surveys of 10 communities 
throughout the United States (15,16).HISTORICAL REVIEW
the virus was clinically expressed as an “inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness” that was transiently debilitating but rarely fatal. In 
addition, however, the virus induced aberrant immune re-
sponses, including excessive and prolonged production of 
interferons, proinﬂ  ammatory cytokines, and chemokines, 
particularly among young adults (34). The pathophysi-
ologic effects included inﬂ  ammation and destruction of 
respiratory epithelium; immune cell inﬁ  ltration of lung 
tissue with edema and hemorrhage; and ultimately, degra-
dation or destruction of virtually all physical and immune 
defenses of the lower respiratory tract (34). Increased sus-
ceptibility of the lower respiratory tract enabled invasion 
by preexisting or newly acquired colonizing strains of 
bacteria (12,35–38). The synergistic effects of infection 
with the virus, aberrant immune responses to the virus, 
and secondary opportunistic bacterial pneumonias were 
severe and often fatal.
Finally, for brief periods and to varying degrees, af-
fected hosts became “cloud adults” who increased the 
aerosolization of colonizing strains of bacteria, particularly 
pneumococci, hemolytic streptococci, H. inﬂ  uenzae, and 
S. aureus (39). For several days during local epidemics—
particularly in crowded settings such as hospital wards, 
military camps, troop ships, and mines—some persons 
were immunologically susceptible to, infected with, or re-
covering from infections with inﬂ  uenza virus. Persons with 
active infections were aerosolizing the bacteria that colo-
nized their noses and throats, while others—often in the 
same “breathing spaces”—were profoundly susceptible to 
invasion of and rapid spread through their lungs by their 
own or others’ colonizing bacteria.
Implications
Why is it important to determine the major pathophysi-
ologic pathways that led to deaths during the 1918–19 in-
ﬂ  uenza pandemic? After all, the effective prevention and 
treatment of inﬂ  uenza infections during a future pandemic 
would prevent all secondary effects, including opportunis-
tic bacterial pneumonias. Yet concerns exist that an effec-
tive strain-speciﬁ  c vaccine and effective antiviral drugs 
may not be produced and distributed to all at-risk popula-
tions in time to mitigate the effects of the next pandemic. In 
the absence of an effective inﬂ  uenza vaccine and antiviral 
drugs, circumstances during a modern inﬂ  uenza pandemic 
could resemble those in 1918–19, with the notable excep-
tion of the availability of bacterial vaccines and antibacte-
rial drugs. The exclusive focus on the prevention and treat-
ment of a novel strain of inﬂ  uenza virus is risky because 
it unnecessarily limits options and opportunities for other 
potentially effective prevention and treatment methods, 
especially in medically underserved populations in less-
developed countries.
We suggest that preparations for the next inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic should focus on more than preventing and treat-
ing inﬂ  uenza virus infections. A modiﬁ  ed inﬂ  uenza pan-
demic plan might include the following components: 1) 
Before a pandemic, expand indications for and decrease 
barriers to receipt of vaccination against S. pneumoniae 
(36–38,40). 2) During a pandemic, in communities not 
yet affected, universally vaccinate with a safe and effec-
tive strain-speciﬁ  c inﬂ  uenza vaccine, if available. 3) Dur-
ing local epidemics, treat all serious clinical cases with an 
antibacterial agent that is effective against S. pneumoniae, 
S. pyogenes, H. inﬂ  uenzae, and S. aureus (including me-
thicillin-resistant S. aureus); isolate patients with clinical 
cases from other patients and as many others as possible 
(35,37–39). 4) Conduct pandemic-related surveillance that 
tracks the incidence, nature (e.g., species, affected sites, 
antimicrobial drug sensitivities), and outcomes of bacterial 
infections that complicate inﬂ  uenza cases.
Given highly variable colonization and drug-sensitiv-
ity patterns across populations and locations, stockpiles of 
antibacterial drugs should be tailored to their intended uses. 
Plans for providing medical care should include evidence-
based triage and treatment algorithms and home-care 
treatment guidelines (including prepackaged antiviral and 
antibacterial drugs) to minimize hospitalizations and maxi-
mize home care. Perhaps most important, pandemic-related 
research activities (including laboratory animal studies, 
statistical models, and clinical trials) should elucidate the 
determinants and effects of bacterial pneumonias that oc-
cur secondary to inﬂ  uenza. Ultimately, research activities 
should determine the most effective uses of antibacterial 
drugs and bacterial vaccines (e.g., indications, agents, dos-
es, and timing for prophylaxis and treatment) in preparation 
for and during pandemic inﬂ  uenza, particularly for medi-
cally underserved and other high-risk populations.
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